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SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
49
People v. Leslie

(decided September 25, 1997)
After a jury trial, defendant, Anthony Leslie, was convicted of
attempted murder in the first degree and sentenced to a term of
twenty-five years to life.15 0 Defendant appealed his conviction
arguing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when
he was "jointly represented in a criminal proceeding by a layman
posing as an attorney and a bona fide attorney appearing pro hac
vice on the motion of the imposter." 151
Two years after defendant's conviction, "and as a result of a

complaint filed against" the imposter attorney, the deception was
uncovered.'

Thereafter, the defendant filed an application

pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 440. 10153 seeking to vacate
the judgment against him on Sixth Amendment grounds. 51 4 The

A.D.2d 94, 662 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1st Dep't 1997).
110 Id. at 100-01, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 765.
I Leslie, 232 A.D.2d at 95, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
152 Id. at 97, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
153 N.Y. CriM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(h) (McKinney 1994). This statute
provides in pertinent part:
At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which
it was entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate
such judgment upon the ground that... [t]he judgment was
obtained in violation of a right of the defendant under the
constitution of this state or of the United States.
Id.
15 Leslie, 232 A.D.2d at 97, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 763. See also U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part that "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the
assistance of counsel for his defence." Id. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This
section states: "In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be
149 232
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trial court cited People v. Winkler,15 5 as precedent, in rejecting
defendant's argument that a per se violation of his right to
counsel occurred due to the presence of the imposter. IIn Winkler, defendant sought to vacate his second degree

murder conviction on the ground that a contingent fee
arrangement in a criminal proceeding was a per se violation of
the Sixth Amendment.5 7 The Winkler court held that a defendant
is entitled to relief if the defendant can show that the "possible
conflict of interest affected the defense in such a way ...
that
meaningful representation was not supplied under the Federal and
State Constitutions." 5 8 Additionally, the court in Leslie stated
that the defendant must demonstrate that a conflict of interest was
created by the participation of the imposter. " 9
In Leslie, the defendant failed to carry his burden."w The court

attributed defendant's failure . . . to the presence of a duly
admitted attorney who acted on defendant's behalf, in addition to
the imposter."' The court found that the representation by the
duly admitted attorney was not deficient in any manner and did

not adversely affect the outcome of the defendant's case.162 The
court found no conflict of interest to exist between the attorney
and the imposter attorney or the defendant and the attorney or the

imposter attorney."' The court concluded that when a defendant
allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions."
Id.
155 71 N.Y.2d 592, 523 N.E.2d 485, 528 N.Y.S.2d 360 (1988).
156Leslie, 232 A.D.2d at 97, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
" Winkler, 71 N.Y.2d at 594, 523 N.E.2d at 486, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
158Id. at 597, 523 N.E.2d at 488, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
159Leslie, 232 A.D.2d at 97, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
160 Id.
161 Id.

6 Id. at 99, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 764. The court noted that the duly admitted
attorney was considered lead counsel and was present in the courtroom at all
times, advocating for his client. Id. "The defense consistently argued the
evidence in an artful, cogent manner, taking advantage of wealmesses in the
People's case, obscuring weaknesses in its own and demonstrating astute
forbearance where appropriate." Id.
I63 Id. "[D]efendant failed to allege any disagreement between [the
attorneys] as to defense strategy." Id.
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is represented by more than one attorney and one turns out to be
an imposter, the mere presence of the imposter will not constitute
a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment."'4 Defendant must
demonstrate that a conflict of interest exists that affects his
defense65 in a manner inconsistent with his Sixth Amendment
1

rights.

The general rule is that when a criminal defendant is
represented unwittingly "by a layman masquerading as an
attorney . . his conviction must be set aside without regard to
whether
he
was
individually
prejudiced
by
such
representation." 6 Given the unique situation before the court,
where an imposter attorney and a bona fide attorney represented
the defendant, the Appellate Division was forced to turn to the
decisions in other jurisdictions.167
In Higgins v. Parker,16 the court found that although the
defendant was represented by an imposter attorney, he was also
represented by a duly licensed attorney.169 The duly licensed
attorney participated in defendant's defense throughout the
representation. 7 0 Based on the record, the court held that the

incompetence of the imposter did not sufficiently support
defendant's claim that the incompetence of the imposter denied
[defendant] his constitutional right to a fair trial.171

'4 Id. at 100-01, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 765.
6 Id. at 99, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 764.
1
6 Id. at 97, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
167

id.

1669 191 S.W.2d
1 Id. at 671.
170 Id. at 670.

668 (Mo. 1945).

The bill of exceptions showed that the duly licensed attorney
participated in the defendant's trial from the beginning of the evidence until the
end. Id.
171 Id. at 669.
At the very least, this case represents the outer limits of
permissible Sixth Amendment representation. In Higgins, "[t]he trial judge,
his successor in office, and an assistant prosecuting attorney who represented
the State in the criminal case, all signed recommendations for [ ] parole
[stating that the imposter attorney] . . . had [ ] unskillfully represented" the
defendant. Id. In addition, petitioner argued that the imposter "botched up"
his case, wrongly advised the defendant, and was fined by the trial judge fifty
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In United States v. Novak, " the court applied a slightly
different analysis in determining whether effective assistance of
counsel was denied when one of two attorneys was subsequently
disbarred after the defendant's trial. The court reasoned that the
question of whether a defect in an attorney's licensure amounted
to a denial of a criminal defendant's right to counsel depended on
whether such defect was merely technical or substantive." The
attorney's disbarment was based on an allegation of fraudulent
misrepresentation in obtaining his license.17 ' The court held that
such a defect was substantive and hence representation by said
attorney did not satisfy the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights." In addition, the court recognized that the duly admitted

co-counsel did not participate and was absent for most of the
dollars for contempt. Id. The Missouri Supreme Court, sitting en banc, held
that:
There are Federal decisions which hold that in some
instances the incompetence of counsel may deny accused his
constitutional right to a fair trial. But these decisions say the
facts must be strong to warrant the overturning of a criminal
judgment on that ground. The facts here certainly do not
warrant it.
Id. at 671.
172 903 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1990).
1' Id. at 888. The Novak court discussed the difference between a
substantive defect in licensure, such as fraudulent misrepresentation and a
technical defect, such as neglecting to take the oath required to practice. Id.
The court noted that the Second Circuit held that a substantive defect is a per
se violation of the Sixth Amendment. Id. (citing Solina v. United States, 709
F.3d 160,167 (2d Cir. 1983)). See also People v. Leslie, 232 A.D.2d 94, 98
n.1, 662 N.Y.S.2d 761, 764 n. 1 (1st Dep't 1997). Interestingly enough, the
attorney in Novak was the infamous Joel Steinberg, "domestic abuser." Id.
Although he was admitted to the Bar, Steinberg was admitted under false
pretenses. Id. He lied about his qualifications in order to obtain a certificate
of dispensation allowing him to forgo the bar exam. Id. Steinberg claimed his
legal studies were interrupted by a requirement that he serve in the military
and thus was entitled to a dispensation that allowed him to be exempted from
taking the bar exam upon completing two-thirds of his studies. Id. Steinberg
also lied about the time he had spent in law school. Id. See also Novak, 903
F.2d at 890.
" Novak, 903 F.2d at 883.
175
Id. at 890.
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trial. 176 However, the court did expressly state that if the
defendant had been represented by the duly admitted lawyer, "at
all critical stages of the proceeding," defendant's Sixth
Amendment protections would have been preserved.177
The Federal and New York State Constitutions are in accord on
the issue of whether the mere presence of an imposter attorney is
a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment.' 78 The initial question
appears to be whether the imposter was representing the attorney
without co-counsel. If he was, it is quite likely that a per se
violation will exist. However, as in the case at bar, when one of
two attorneys is an imposter, the critical question will be whether
the participation of the imposter attorney created a conflict of
interest that affected the defense in such a way as to deprive
defendant of his right to effective legal counsel. 179 If the court
finds that effective legal representation was rendered by a duly
licensed attorney at all critical times, no violation of defendant's
Sixth Amendment right will be found.
Defendant, Leslie, further argued that he was denied assistance
of effective counsel by his duly admitted lawyer because an
admission pro hac vice,' 80 does not authorize an attorney to
practice in pre-trial motions."18 In support of his argument, the
defendant offered a Third Department case, Largeteau v.
Smith.18 Largeteau held that pro hac vice admissions of out-ofstate attorneys limit practice to trial or argument.1 3 The Leslie
court rejected Largeteau and preferred to follow Johnson v.
Mesch Eng'g, P.C.,84 a Forth Department decision. In Johnson,
the court held that pro hac vice admission "should be read to
176Id.at

891.
1 Id. at 890.
178 See People v. Leslie, 232 A.D.2d 94, 99-100, 662 N.Y.S.2d 761, 764-65
(1st Dep't 1997).
9Leslie, 232 A.D.2d at 97, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
18oSee supra note
8 Leslie, 232 A.D.2d at 99, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 764.
182 197 A.D.2d 832, 603 N.Y.S.2d 62 (3d Dep't 1993).
183 Id. at 833, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
See also Leslie, 232 A.D.2d at 99, 662
N.Y.S.2d at 765.
'8 212 A.D.2d 970, 624 N.Y.S.2d 710 (4th Dep't 1995).
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encompass admission for matters of pre-trial preparation
including pre-trial discovery."'8 Additionally, The New York
Code of Rules and Regulations § 520. 1 (a)(1)' 86 provides that pro
hac vice admissions permit "participation in any matter in which
the attorney is employed.""

The Leslie court concluded by rejecting defendant's argument
that he was denied effective counsel in violation of the Sixth
Amendment and rejecting defendant's pro hac vice admission
argument.' When representation is provided by two attorneys,
one of which is an imposter, a violation of the Sixth Amendment
to the Federal and State Constitutions exists only when the
defendant was prejudiced by the presence of the imposter and
when the duly licensed attorney failed to provide effective
counsel.189 Neither the Federal nor the State Constitutions
recognize a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment when an
imposter attorney assists a duly licensed attorney.'90
Furthermore, a pro hac vice admission allows an attorney to
participate at any stage of a legal proceeding.' 9'

85

1

id.

186

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 520.11 (a)(1) (1995) provides

that:
An attorney and counselor-at-law or the equivalent who is a
member in good standing of the bar of another state,
territory, district or foreign country may be admitted pro hac
vice . . . in the discretion of any court of record, to
participate in any matter in which the attorney is employed.
Id.
187

Id.

188Leslie,

232 A.D.2d at 99-100, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 764-65.
189
See supra notes
and accompanying text.
190See supra notes
and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes
and accompanying text.
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